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Abstract. In an environment in which free-riders are better off than
cooperators, social control is required to foster and maintain coopera-
tion. There are two main paths through which social control can be ap-
plied: punishment and reputation. Our experiments explore the efficacy
of punishment and reputation on cooperation rates, both in isolation
and in combination. Using a Public Goods Game, we are interested in
assessing how cooperation rates change when agents can play one of two
different reactive strategies, i.e., they can pay a cost in order to reduce
the payoff of free-riders, or they can know others’ reputation and then
either play defect with free-riders, or refuse to interact with them. Co-
operation is maintained at a high level through punishment, but also
reputation-based partner selection proves effective in maintaining coop-
eration. However, when agents are informed about free-riders’ reputation
and play Defect, cooperation decreases. Finally, a combination of punish-
ment and reputation-based partner selection leads to higher cooperation
rates.
Keywords: Reputation, Punishment, Agent-based simulation, free-riding, so-
cial control, public goods game.
1 Introduction
Social control is an emergent social phenomenon, which allows the costs of pro-
social behavior to be redistributed over a population in which cooperators live
side-by-side with non-cooperators. Some specific phenomena are usually sub-
sumed under the large heading of social control, including ostracism [3, 16] and
altruistic punishment. The latter is defined as a costly aggression inflicted to
cheaters by members of the group who did not necessarily undergo attacks from
the punished, nor get direct benefits out of the sanction applied [10]. Accord-
ing to strong reciprocity theory, the presence of individuals who altruistically
reward cooperative acts and punish norm violating behavior at a cost to them-
selves sustains cooperation and promotes social order [12]. However, the act of
punishment results in an immediate reduction of welfare both for the punisher
2and for the punished individual, thus posing several problems, like efficiency [28,
8], and the risk of counter-aggression [20].
An alternative solution can be found in weak reciprocity supported by rep-
utation. Knowing about others’ past behaviors is crucial to avoid cheaters and
select good partners, especially when the group is large and it is not possible
to directly witness all the interactions. Moreover, reputation allows the costs
of social control to be reduced and distributed among individuals [13]. The im-
portance of reputation in supporting cooperation has been proven in laboratory
experiments [29], evolutionary models [21], and simulation studies [9]. Reputa-
tion is a signal that conveys socially relevant information about one’s peers, and
plays a fundamental role in identyfing cheaters and isolating them.
Notwithstanding their importance in supporting cooperation, costly mone-
tary punishment and reputation spreading have never been directly compared.
Moving from the work of Carpenter [4], in which the provision of public goods is
not negatively affected by the size of the group but by the ability of mutual mon-
itoring among agents, we enriched the original model by designing agents who
spread reputation about their previous partners. Extending previous research
on cooperation and reputation [9]and on cooperation and punishment [28], we
explore the performance of punishment and reputation as mechanisms for social
control, and we test their effects on cooperation rates both in isolation and in
combination.
Here we present a simulation platform to compare the effectiveness of costly
punishment and reputation spreading in maintaining cooperation in a popula-
tion in which defectors have a selective advantage because they exploit others’
contributions, without paying the costs of cooperation. Using a Public Goods
Game [4], we measure cooperation rates in mixed populations in which there
are pure cooperators, pure cheaters and agents who play reactive strategies. Our
contribution adds to existing literature in three ways:
1. we introduce a systematic exploration of two different social control mecha-
nisms, and we test them also in combination with other parameters, like the
group size and the costs of punishing;
2. we specify two different mechanisms for reputation: Refuse and Defect (they
will be extensively explained in Section 3). Refuse is a partner choice mecha-
nism which permits gossipers to avoid free-riders, whereas Defect is a social
control mechanism that leads gossipers to defect against non-cooperators.
Both these mechanisms are present in human societies, in which we use rep-
utational information to avoid cheaters (when this is possible), or to treat
them as we expect them to treat us. This difference between these reactions
makes it important to compare them and to understand the conditions that
make one mechanism more effective than the other.
3. we assess the extent to which reputation spreading and punishment are com-
parable mechanisms for social control, by comparing directly agents’ average
contributions when costly monetary punishment and reputation spreading
are available.
3In Section 2 we will introduce related work, in Section 3 we describe the simu-
lation model, and Section 4 will present the simulation results. In Section 5 we
will draw some conclusions and we will also sketch some ideas for future work.
2 Related Work
In their evolutionary history, humans have developed several mechanisms for the
emergence and establishment of social norms [2]. Punishment and reputation are
among the most widespread and effective mechanisms to sustain cooperation and
they are specially interesting for virtual societies in which the efficacy of enforc-
ing mechanisms is limited by a combination of factors (like their massive size,
their spontaneity of creation and destruction, and dynamics). There is a large
body of evidence showing that humans are willing to punish non-cooperators,
even when this implies a reduction in their payoffs [11], and this is true also in
simulation settings. Villatoro et al. [28] have analyzed the effect of sanctioning
on the emergence of the norm of cooperation, showing that a monetary pun-
ishment accompanied with a norm elicitation, that is, sanctioning, allowed the
system to reach higher cooperation levels at lower costs, when compared with
other punishment strategies.
Reputation is, along with punishment, the other strategy used to support
cooperation, even if it works in a completely different way. If punishing means
paying a cost in order to make the other pay an even higher cost for his de-
fection, reputation implies that the information about agents’ past behavior
becomes known, and this allows agents to avoid ill-reputed individuals. In Ax-
elrod’s words [1]: “Knowing people’s reputation allows you to know something
about what strategy they use even before you have to make your first choice”
(p.151). The importance of reputation for promoting and sustaining social con-
trol is uncontroversial and it has been demonstrated both in lab experiments [24]
and in simulation settings, in which reputation has proven to be a cheap and
effective means to avoid cheaters and increase cooperators’ payoffs [22].
When partner selection is available, reputation becomes essential for dis-
criminating between good and bad partners, and then to be protected against
exploitation. Giardini and Conte [14] presented ethnographic data from different
traditional societies along with simulation data, showing how reputation spread-
ing evolved as a solution to the problem of adaptation posed by social control,
and highlighting the importance of gossip as a means to reduce the costs of
cheaters’ identification. The effect of partner selection has been studied also by
Perrau and others [7], who have analyzed the effect of ostracism in virtual soci-
eties, obtaining high levels of tolerance against free-riders. However, in the work
of Perrau, agents do not explicitly transmit information about other agents, they
only reason about the interactions.
In the multi-agent field, several attempts have been made to model and use
reputation, especially in two sub-fields of information technologies, i.e., com-
puterized interaction (with a special reference to electronic marketplaces), and
agent-mediated interaction (for a review, see [19]). Models of reputation for
4multi-agent systems applications [30, 25, 17] clearly show the positive effects of
reputation, and there are also interesting cases in which trust is paired with
reputation (for a couple of exhaustive reviews, see [23, 27]).
More specifically, Sabater and colleagues [26, 6] developed a computational
system called REPAGE in which different kinds of reputational information were
taken into account and the role of information reliability in a market-like simu-
lation scenario was addressed. Analogously, Giardini and colleagues [9] showed
that reputation was a means to punish untruthful informers without bearing the
costs of further retaliation, at the same time protecting the system from collaps-
ing. In addition, for certain percentages of cheating rates, in both studies, the
authors showed that reputation played a relevant role in enhancing the quality
of production in an artificial cluster of interacting firms.
3 The model
Moving from the simulation framework developed in [5], we designed a simulation
platform in NetLogo in order to compare the performance of costly punishment
and reputation spreading in mixed populations in which different types of agents
play a Public Good Game (PGG), the classical experimental model used to
investigate social dilemmas [18]. In this game, agents decide whether to free-
ride or to contribute3 a fixed amount (a contribution of 1 unit) to a public
pool. The sum of all the contributions is multiplied by a benefit factor (set
to 3 in the current model 4) and the resulting quantity is divided amongst all
the participants in the group, without considering their contributions. This is a
classic public good where free-riding would be the utility maximizing strategy
at the individual level; however, if all agents adopted that strategy, this would
result in the overexploitation of resources and in a worse outcome at the group
level (the so-called Tragedy of the Commons [15]).
Agents are either non-reactive or reactive types. In the former category we
find Cooperators (C), who always contribute to the common pool, and Free-
riders (FR), who never contribute to the common pool. Reactive agents change
their behaviors in response to the percentage of detected free-riders in their
group: when the number of known defectors in a group is too high, i.e., it ex-
ceeds a certain threshold, agents become active and their strategy changes (as
described in Algorithm 1). Each and every agent is endowed with an initial
amount of 50 points that can be used to cooperate or to punish others; regard-
less of the strategy, agents are culled from the game when their payoff goes to
zero and they are not replaced. The other strategies are:
3 Note that the decision in this framework is binary whether to cooperate or not.
In other works, specially in those of experimental economics, this decision has to
be taken in a continuum, deciding how much to contribute from a total amount of
money common to all agents.
4 According to the game design, in order for contribution to be irrational for a utility-
maximizer individual, the tokens in the pot must be multiplied by an amount smaller
than the number of players and greater than 1.
5Algorithm 1 Description of punisher’s behaviors
for Number of Timesteps do
Random group formation of the population;
Agents take First Stage decision;
Gather and Distribution of the Public good in each group;
First Stage Decisions are made public within the group;
Agents make Second Stage decision;
Punishment Execution;
end for
– Tit-for-Tat (TFT): They start as cooperators but if active, they start free-
riding until exiting from the active state.
– Nice Punishers (NP): They contribute in the passive state; once active, they
punish free-riders at a cost to themselves and making FRs pay a cost, but
they continue to cooperate in the PGG. This behavior will continue until
the agent exits the active state (by being assigned in a group with a number
of cheaters below the threshold).
– Mean Punishers (MP): They contribute in the passive state; once active,
they punish free-riders and free ride themselves in the PGG until they exit
the active state.
To the above types, developed by Carpenter [5], we add two more types, in order
to compare punishment and reputation. Active Gossipers transmit and receive
information and they integrate their personal experience and the reputational
information received from other Gossipers in order to react against Free-Riders.
Gossipers’ behavior is described in Algorithm 2 (2). Gossipers can be:
– Nice Gossipers (NG): Agents contribute in the passive state; once active,
they start spreading information about free-riders, and cooperate in the
PGG.
– Mean Gossipers (MG): Agents contribute in the passive state; once active,
they start spreading information about free-riders, but they always defect in
the PGG when active.
In this work, we explore the efficacy of two different ways of using reputation.
Reputation allows agents to be informed about other members of their group
before interacting with them, hence this information can be used in two ways,
either to retaliate against free-riders or to refrain from interacting with them. The
former modality, called “Defect”, consists in Gossipers not contributing to the
PGG when playing in a group containing too many cheaters. The latter modality,
“Refuse” allows agents to refuse the interaction by skipping a turn, taking their
contribution away from the pools, and paying the price of not receiving any
dividend, if the number of known defectors in their current group assignment
would make them active. Refusal cannot be performed twice in a row. In both
modalities, Gossipers transmit information about cheaters, informing their peers
of the identity of non-cooperators and using the information they receive from
them.
6Algorithm 2 Description of gossipers’ behaviors
for Number of Timesteps do
Random group formation of the population;
if Group has bad reputation then
Apply reputation strategy
else
Take First stage decision according to active/passive status.
end if
Gather and Distribution of the Public good in each group;
First Stage Decisions are made public within the group;
Agents make Second Stage decision;
Reputation diffusion;
end for
4 Experiments and Results
We run three different sets of simulations, each one lasting for 100 time steps.
Each experiment was repeated 20 times for each combination of the selected
parameters. The cost of contributing to the Public Good was set to 1, and the
sum of all the contributions was multiplied by a benefit factor set to 3. The public
good, i.e., the resulting quantity, was divided among all the group members,
without considering whether they contributed or not. Simulations started with
equal proportions of each strategy. Variables of interest are summarized in Table
1.
Table 1. Parameters of the simulation
PARAMETERS
COST (cost of punishing) 0.2 1
PUNISHMENT (cost of being punished) 2 5
GROUP SIZE 5 10 25 50
INFORMATION TRANSMITTED 0 1 10
In our first experiment we tested the effect of punishment as a partner con-
trol mechanism on cooperation rates measured as the total number of agents
playing C divided by the total number of active agents per time step. Nice and
Mean Punishers became active when they detected more than 20% of defec-
tions in their group. Punishing costed the punisher x and the punished agent
y, with y ≥ x. We identified 4 different combinations of Punishment and Cost:
LpLc (low punishment, low cost), HpLc (high punishment, low cost), LpHc (low
punishment, High cost) and HpHc (high punishment and high cost). The co-
operation rates are affected by group size, and they change according to the
different combinations of punishment and cost (Figure 1). When punishment is
low and the cost is high, cooperation rates are the lowest for every group size.
Both HpHc and HpLc allows cooperation to reach 100%, no matter the group
7size and in a quite short amount of time. This is probably due to the fact that
high punishment leads Free-Riders to use up all their resources, while protecting
the other agents. Moreover, once the percentage of tolerated Free-riders goes be-
low the fixed threshold, all the other populations contribute, thus maintaining
cooperation stable and complete.
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Fig. 1. Cooperation rates over time for different group sizes in mixed populations with
C, FR, TFT, NP and MP. When punishment is costly (HpLc, HpHc), Free-riders are
easily controlled and cooperation can be maintained. When the cost is high and the
punishment is not (LpHc) the cooperation rate is always lower than in the other cases.
Our second experiment was designed to test the effects of information spread-
ing in isolating Free-Riders and maintaining cooperation. We were also inter-
ested in comparing the efficacy of the two modalities, and to assess which one
worked better. We tested the effectiveness of “Refuse” and “Defect” for different
amounts of information (i) available. Manipulating the number of gossips trans-
mitted {i = 0; 1; 10} for each time-step, we wanted to test whether the amount
of information had an effect on the ability of gossipers to react directly (playing
“Defect”), or indirectly (playing “Refuse”) against Free-riders.
When agents used the “Defect” modality, cooperation rates declined for every
group size. In the “Defect” modality (upper part of Figure 2 2), cooperation rates
were higher in the first 20 periods, but they showed a rapid decrease in the last
20 periods. Increasing the amount of information about other agents made this
decrease steeper, even if this pattern remained stable for different group sizes.
8This is due to the fact that playing “Defect” triggered even more defections,
thus reducing the overall cooperation rate and making the decrease even steeper
when the amount of available information was higher.
defect, no gossip defect, 1 gossip defect, 10 gossips























Fig. 2. Cooperation rates over time for Defect (top) and Refuse (bottom) strategies for
Gossipers. In larger groups (25 and 50 agents) the amount of information has a negative
effect on cooperation rates when the reaction is based on defection, as compared to the
Refuse strategy. In this latter case, cooperation rates are stable and quite high.
On the contrary, when gossipers played ”Refuse”, cooperation levels were
quite high for all group sizes. Small groups showed higher cooperation rates
(Figure 2, bottom panel), because refusing dangerous interactions in small groups
was effective in isolating cheaters and in making cooperators interact with other
cooperators. Taking into account the first periods of the simulation experiments,
we saw that there are interesting differences in the cooperation rates, not only
between groups of different sizes, but also among situations with zero, one or
ten items of information (3).
In a scenario in which all strategies are loaded, we compared the performance
of populations in which all the strategies were present (C, FR, TFT, NP, MP,
NG and MG) for different combinations of costs (HpHc, HpLc, LcHp, LcLp), for
different group size (5 and 50). Figure 3 (4) shows that punishment and reputa-
tion can have a combined effect that boosts cooperation to 1 in large groups in
every situation but in the LpHc. The negative effect of Defect is confirmed also
when there are both Punishers and Gossipers, and it is also made more relevant
by the higher amount of information.
5 Discussion and future work
In this work we proposed a direct comparison between reputation spreading and
costly monetary punishment for controlling free-riding in a Public Goods Game.
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Fig. 3. Cooperation rates in the first 40 ticks of the simulation experiment. When
Gossipers can refuse the interaction, receiving more information (10 gossips) increases
the cooperation rates in the initial phases of the simulation, especially for groups of 5
and 10 agents.
 5, LpLc  5, LpHc  5, HpHc


























Fig. 4. Cooperation rates for all populations for different combinations of costs of pun-
ishment and number of gossips for small (5 agents) and large groups (25 agents). Both
small and large groups achieve the highest percentages of cooperation when punish-
ment is costly and being punished is costly as well (HpHc), even if this happens mostly
in the larger group, where cooperation rate is 1 for all the populations except for the
one including agents playing “Defect” and transmitting 10 gossips. This population
has a good performance only when the group is big (25 agents) and the costs of pun-
ishment are low (LpLc). “Refuse” is the best strategy and its efficacy is increased by
the amount of information exchanged.
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These strategies, punishment and reputation spreading, were tested in order to
investigate their effects on cooperation rates in mixed populations, and to assess
how effective they are in preventing cooperation from extinction in different set-
tings. Our contribution added to existing literature by introducing a systematic
exploration of different elements, in isolation and in combination. The effects of
these strategies in isolation have been tested in a variety of settings and environ-
ments, but it is also interesting to compare them directly. Costly punishment is
an effective strategy in promoting cooperation, and here it works quite well in
selecting out the free-riders, especially when the cost of being punished is much
higher than the cost of punishing, as expected. Even more interesting is our
finding that in larger groups the effect of punishing, even when it is not costly,
can support cooperation much better than in smaller groups.
We also introduced two different strategies based on reputation with the
goal of evaluating two alternative ways of using information about cheaters.
The Refuse strategy can be considered pro-active and it proved to be the best
strategy in terms of cooperation rates, for every population composition. On
the other hand, the Defect strategy was designed as a direct retaliation against
cheaters, with negative consequences on the average cooperation rates in our
populations. These two strategies worked in different ways and are not directly
comparable, but their usage may shed new light on the conditions that make
one mechanism more effective than the other, also considering that in humans
societies the two options are usually available at the same time. It is worth
noting that, on average, cooperation rates with Refuse were close to 70%, which
is a very high percentage, especially because Gossipers were not able to affect
Free-Riders’ payoffs directly, as Punishers did, so their expected efficacy was
much lower. Nonetheless, being able to use reputation to identify Free-Riders
before interacting with them was really effecting in preventing exploitation and
fostering cooperation.
This work represents a first step in a process of exploring different combina-
tions of direct, i.e., punishment, and indirect, i.e., reputation, mechanisms for
promoting cooperation in social dilemmas. Our platform will allow us to explore
single parameters and different combinations of them, with the aim of under-
standing how they work, and in what way their combination may determine the
success of a given strategy. We do not claim that reputation is a better mecha-
nism, but our data show that it is worth exploring the possibility that, for given
combinations of parameters, reputation would be more effective in sustaining
social control.
Regarding future works, with the advent of social networking platforms like
Facebook or Twitter, and motivated by the Living Labs philosophy, a possible
extension would be to perform experiments on social networks sites with real
subjects. Because of the public access to the messages shared by the users and the
underlying social network that connects then, Twitter could be the best platform
where to perform our experiment. We plan to identify active communities within
the social platform and made them play with bots developed by us. Our bots
will allow us to generate controlled situations, and study the different treatments
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discussed in this paper. Measures like the virtual earnings of the players, the
messages sent amongst users and the changes on the underlying social network
will be observed and used as indicators to extract our results.
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